



This paper proposes an approach to the philosophy of mathematics,4
deductive pluralism, that is designed to satisfy the criteria of inclusiveness5
of and consistency with mathematical practice. Deductive pluralism views6
mathematical statements as assertions that a result follows from logical7
and mathematical foundations and that there are a variety of incompat-8
ible foundations such as standard foundations, constructive foundations,9
or univalent foundations. The advantages of this philosophy include the10
elimination of ontological problems, epistemological clarity, and objec-11
tivity. Possible objections and relations with some other philosophies of12
mathematics are also considered.13
1 INTRODUCTION14
This paper proposes an approach to the philosophy of mathematics, deductive15
pluralism, that is designed to be inclusive of existing mathematics and consistent16
with mathematical practice. Here mathematical practice refers to mathematical17
statements, such as definitions, examples, and theorems. We will also show that18
deductive pluralism is consistent with many of the attitudes expressed by math-19
ematicians towards the questions of the absolute or relative nature of concepts20
such as consistency, existence, or truth in mathematics – see section 1.1 for a21
discussion of terminology and concepts as used in this paper. Without inclu-22
siveness a decision would need to be made about what to exclude, creating a23
partial philosophy of mathematics, and without any generally acceptable crite-24
ria for what is to be excluded. Without consistency with mathematical practice25
a philosophy of mathematics would be incompatible with mathematics, an un-26
acceptable position for a purported philosophy of mathematics. The argument27
of this paper is that there are varieties of mathematics that have incompatible28
mathematical or logical foundations, sometimes implicit, and thus to satisfy the29
inclusiveness criterion a pluralist approach is required. By inclusiveness none of30
the varieties can be considered as true in an absolute sense (otherwise the others31
would be rejected) and so within a variety the statements need to be viewed as32
implications, requiring a deductivist approach. As we will see in the discussion33
of the attitudes of mathematicians and the reports by philosophers about these34
attitudes, modern mathematics has moved towards attitudes consistent with35
deductivism and pluralism. Thus a modern philosophy of mathematics should36
reflect these changes.37
Several varieties of mathematics will be discussed in the next section, includ-38
ing: “standard mathematics” which has as foundations the intended interpre-39
tation of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC) and with40
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First Order Predicate Calculus (FOPC) as the logic; constructive mathemat-41
ics; univalent foundations; and inconsistent mathematics. The mathematical or42
logical foundations of a variety, sometimes called a framework for the variety,43
have been systematized to varying extents: some have been axiomatized for a44
century, but others are works in progress and with different approaches within45
a variety.46
In deductive pluralism mathematical assertions state that a conclusion fol-47
lows from assumptions, ultimately from the logical and mathematical founda-48
tions after a long development of definitions and intermediate results. Thus49
deductive pluralism is a form of deductivism but may differ from other forms by50
allowing both the logical and the mathematical foundations to vary, by not re-51
quiring the foundations to be purely formal uninterpreted axioms, or by allowing52
foundations other than set theory.53
Section 1.1 below discusses some terminology and concepts used in this pa-54
per, and then section 2 discusses some varieties of mathematics that are dis-55
tinguished by incompatible mathematical or logical foundations, highlighting56
these inconsistencies. The attitudes of leading mathematicians developing or57
using a variety are cited to show substantial compatibility with deductive plu-58
ralism. Section 3 considers deductive pluralism as a philosophy of mathematics59
by discussing its ontology and epistemology as well as its consistency with math-60
ematical practice and attitudes. Section 4 considers some possible objections to61
deductive pluralism as a variety of deductivism. Section 5 then considers de-62
ductive pluralism as it relates to some other philosophies of mathematics. Since63
logical assumptions are part of a foundation for a variety there is an appendix64
on relevant logical concepts which may be referred to as needed. There is also65
an appendix giving some examples of the historical development of mathematics66
towards an axiomatic (thus deductive) viewpoint.67
1.1 Terminology and Concepts as Used in This Paper68
This section will discuss some terminology and concepts, with illustrations from69
standard mathematics. As used in this paper a variety of mathematics is not70
merely a theory: within a variety there may be many mathematical theories71
but these theories have the same foundation and thus these theories are not72
classified as varieties. Within a variety different theories are applicable to and73
illuminate other theories. For example in standard mathematics number theory74
is consistent with and uses results from analysis (analytic number theory) and75
algebra (algebraic number theory). A criterion for consideration as a variety is76
that the mathematics appears in professional publications such as journals or77
books. Since contemporary mathematics subsumes historical mathematics, clar-78
ifying and generalizing its implicit assumptions and foundations, this criterion79
embraces mathematics as it has been done throughout history.80
In this paper a fully formal proof is one that can be checked step by step,81
in particular by a computerized proof checker. Such a proof is objective in82
that mathematicians favoring any variety of mathematics would agree that a83
fully formalized proof within another variety does establish that the conclusion84
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follows from the logical and mathematical assumptions within that variety. We85
will consider a rigorous proof as one that can be fully formalized in a relatively86
straightforward manner, such as by filling in details. This concept of rigor is87
necessarily imprecise since it will vary between mathematicians, between areas88
of mathematics, and in different historical periods.89
A useful distinction applicable to a variety of mathematics is between syn-90
tax and semantics: that is, between the axiomatic, uninterpreted formalism (the91
syntax) and the interpretations of the formalism (the semantics). The formal-92
ism is used in fully formal or rigorous theorems and proofs, providing some ad-93
vantages including: explicit assumptions (axioms); clarification of relationships94
between systems of axioms; and applicability of results to all interpretations.95
The semantics will be in a system that is assumed to be better understood,96
more basic, or have other advantages over the formal system. An uninterpreted97
formal system usually needs a semantics in order to provide intuition, examples,98
or a basis for deciding such questions as existence, validity or satisfaction. In99
order to do this an interpretation requires a satisfaction predicate. An inter-100
pretation of a formal system is called a model for the system if the axioms of101
the system are satisfied. By Go¨del’s completeness theorem a first order sys-102
tem has a model if and only if it is consistent. Since some assumptions are103
necessary – nothing comes from nothing, ex nihilo nihil fit – to avoid infinite104
regress the search for semantics or interpretations must stop somewhere with a105
satisfaction predicate that is assumed to be consistent. This distinction is best106
developed in standard mathematics in which model theory studies formal unin-107
terpreted axioms and their interpretations in set theory. Thus the foundation108
of standard mathematics must include both the formal axioms of ZFC and a109
set theory, such as the intended interpretation. Since ZFC and other first order110
theories containing Dedekind-Peano arithmetic cannot prove their own consis-111
tency by Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, consistency of both formal ZFC and112
its intended interpretation are usually implicitly assumed. The assumption of113
consistency then allows new axiomatically defined structures to be shown to be114
consistent relative to that theory. For example the Dedekind-Peano axioms for115
the natural numbers were proven by Dedekind to be consistent and unique up to116
isomorphism within ZFC and its intended interpretation. (Sometimes a concept117
is unique up to a unique isomorphism, as in the universal diagram definitions118
within category theory.)119
The next concept is that of truth. Since mathematics deals with abstracta,120
attributing truth to existential assertions can be problematical, so some relevant121
meanings of truth will be considered here. Standard mathematics has a concept122
of truth within model theory: a sentence in an axiomatic system is true if it is123
true in all models, and truth in a model is defined in terms of the interpretation124
of the axiomatic system within set theory. For example Go¨del’s sentence is125
true in the intended interpretation of Dedekind-Peano arithmetic but not true126
in all interpretations. When mathematicians state that a sentence is true they127
may be using (possibly implicitly) one of several concepts: the mathematical128
(model theoretic) concept, so that in a first order theory true is equivalent to129
provable; true in the intended interpretation of ZFC but not necessarily provable130
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(as with Go¨del’s sentence); or some concept which is independent of models131
or proofs and thus will be referred to as an absolute concept of truth rather132
than the mathematical concept of truth which is relative to model-theoretic133
interpretations. Since the ideas of truth may vary when discussing mathematical134
concepts, it may be necessary to clarify which concept is meant.135
Many mathematical statements assert the existence of a mathematical ob-136
ject, e.g., the empty set exists. The object may be asserted to exist relative to137
some explicit or implicit assumptions, e.g., given ZFC then there is an empty138
set, or absolutely. In this paper the use of the term “object” will reflect common139
mathematical usages and will not imply either absolute or relative existence.140
The final concept is the distinction between relative or absolute consistency.141
The assertion that system A is consistent relative to system B means that if142
B is consistent then A is consistent (i.e., in the context of foundational logi-143
cal and mathematical assumptions the consistency of B implies the consistency144
of A). We will say that a system is absolutely consistent if it is consistent as145
such, independent of the consistency of other systems. In the case of starting146
points for deductions where only one system is under consideration, such as the147
foundations for a variety of mathematics, the distinction is somewhat different.148
In these cases an absolute view would be, e.g., that ZFC is absolutely consis-149
tent while a contrasting position might be that it is reasonable to assume the150
consistency of ZFC.151
The concepts of truth, consistency and existence are often closely related.152
A mathematical statement to which truth may be assigned often asserts the153
existence of a concept or the consistency of a theory. Also, existence is sometimes154
defined in terms of consistency: as we will see in section 3.1 Hilbert wrote that155
a mathematical concept exists if it is consistent.156
2 VARIETIES OF MATHEMATICS157
Most of mathematics as practiced, both pure and applied, is standard mathe-158
matics, which constitutes the great majority of what is taught in educational159
institutions, appears in publications, and is used in applications. Since standard160
mathematics is so dominate and extensive most other varieties of mathematics,161
including those discussed below, are careful to include many of the same or162
similar theories and theorems as standard mathematics.163
2.1 Nonstandard Analysis164
Nonstandard analysis is an extension of standard mathematics that provides for165
infinitesimals and was developed by Abraham Robinson to put them on a rig-166
orous foundation. The logic is the same as in standard mathematics, and there167
are many approaches to developing the infinitesimals. Nonstandard analysis is a168
conservative extension of standard mathematics in that any proposition stated169
in the language of standard mathematics that can be proven using nonstandard170
analysis can also be proven using standard mathematics. An example of this171
4
is the nonstandard proof by Bernstein and Robinson [1966] that every polyno-172
mially compact operator has a non-trivial invariant subspace, which appeared173
back to back with a standard proof. In his article Bernstein wrote that “[t]he174
proof is within the framework of Nonstandard Analysis” [Bernstein and Robin-175
son, 1966, p 421], which illustrates that when a variety of mathematics other176
than standard mathematics is used the foundations are made explicit, especially177
if the work is in a journal containing standard mathematics in which standard178
foundations would otherwise be implicitly assumed.179
2.2 Tarski-Grothendieck Set Theory180
Tarski-Grothendieck set theory (TG or ZFCU) is a nonconservative extension181
of ZFC using FOPC. A motivation is to provide a basis for category theory and182
in particular for Grothendieck’s work in algebraic geometry. Many categories183
of interest, such as the category of all topological spaces, are proper classes. To184
allow for these TG set theory adds an axiom U to ZFC, giving ZFCU, stating185
that every set is an element of a Grothendieck universe, where a Grothendieck186
universe is a set defined so that it is closed under the usual set operations187
such as the power set. A Grothendieck universe is equivalent to an inaccessible188
cardinal, where an inaccessible cardinal is one that cannot be reached from below189
by the usual set operations. Since a Grothendieck universe acts as an internal190
model for ZFC the consistency of TG implies the consistency of ZFC and so by191
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem (which implies that ZFC cannot prove192
its own consistency) TG must be a nonconservative extension of ZFC. Thus a193
Grothendieck universe is an object that exists in ZFCU but not in ZFC.194
In spite of the conceptual clarity provided by Grothendieck universes (and195
the prestige of Grothendieck) there is a reluctance to go beyond ZFC even196
within algebraic geometry. The Stacks Project [2014], an open source collabo-197
rative ongoing textbook on algebraic stacks and the required algebraic geometry,198
explicitly avoids the use of universes. This is an example of the reluctance of199
mathematicians to add axioms to ZFC, which is supported by the fact that200
extensions of ZFC generally increase the possibility of an inconsistency and is201
contrary to the admonition of Ockham’s razor that entities should not be mul-202
tiplied beyond necessity.203
2.3 Constructive Mathematics204
Constructive mathematics is an example of a variety of mathematics in which205
the mathematical assertions and logic have both rules and interpretations dif-206
ferent from standard mathematics. The basic idea is that the existence of a207
mathematical object can only be asserted if there is a method of constructing208
the object. This requires that intuitionistic logic be used in which the Law209
of the Excluded Middle (LEM) fails: if P is an assertion then P ∨ ¬P can210
be asserted only when there is a constructive method of asserting P or a con-211
structive method of asserting ¬P , which is not always possible. Similarly an212
assertion that P implies Q is interpreted as stating that there is a construc-213
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tive way of transforming the construction for P into a construction for Q. The214
main version of constructivism was developed from the work of Bishop [1967], in215
which standard mathematics is a proper extension of constructive mathematics.216
Thus all theorems of constructive mathematics are also theorems of standard217
mathematics, but not conversely. An example of an object familiar to most218
mathematicians that exists in standard mathematics but not in constructive219
mathematics is the Dirichlet (or comb) function, which is defined on the unit220
interval so that it is 1 on the rational numbers and 0 on the irrational numbers in221
the interval. It cannot be defined constructively [Bridges and Palmgren, 2013],222
but in standard mathematics it is an important example of a function that is223
Lebesgue integrable but not Riemann integrable.224
2.4 Univalent Foundations225
The univalent foundations program, currently under active development, is an226
example of a variety of mathematics not based on set theory. It has as its ba-227
sis an extension of the predicative, intuitionistic Martin-Lo¨f type theory with228
additional axioms such as univalence. Just as standard set theory assumes the229
existence of the empty set and has axioms that assert the existence of new230
sets given existing sets (e.g., unions), univalent foundations assumes the needed231
types, such as the natural number type. The logic is intuitionistic and in this232
approach there are several primitive concepts including type, identity of types,233
function types, and ordered pairs. The motivating interpretation is homotopy234
theory in which types are considered as spaces and with constructions as homo-235
topy invariants. The univalence axiom implies that isomorphic structures can236
be identified. Identifying structures up to isomorphism is common in standard237
mathematics, e.g., the von Neumann, Zermelo, and other interpretations of the238
natural numbers are isomorphic in standard set theory and thus can be consid-239
ered identical as a type. However in standard mathematics isomorphic objects240
are not necessarily identified. For example the singleton sets {0} and {1} are241
isomorphic as sets (and by a unique isomorphism) but if they are identified242
then by extensionality the elements would be the same and so as a consequence243
0 = 1. Thus univalent foundations are incompatible with standard set theory.244
Univalent foundations does, however, define a class of types that behave in a245
similar manner to classical sets in many applications. Unlike other versions246
of constructivism the univalence approach does not deny the Law of Excluded247
Middle in principle, but uses variations on it as needed in theorems. Addi-248
tional assumptions and particular care in the presentations of the theory are249
required due to the predicative nature of the type theory, as when presenting250
impredicative concepts such as the power set or the least upper bound. Another251
interesting feature is the use of the Coq proof assistant, which implements the252
logic. With regard to interpretations and consistency, the authors of the uni-253
valent foundations book [The Univalent Foundations Program Authors, 2013,254
p. 11] wrote:255
As with any foundational system, consistency is a relative question:256
consistent with respect to what? The short answer is that all of the257
6
constructions and axioms considered in this book have a model in the258
category of Kan complexes, due to Voevodsky ... . Thus, they are259
known to be consistent relative to ZFC (with as many inaccessible260
cardinals as we need nested univalent universes).261
This quotation illustrates the common view, which also holds in deductive plu-262
ralism, that statements about consistency are relative rather than absolute.263
Since univalent foundations uses category theory, among other theories, as264
a basis for interpretation and consistency, it is appropriate to now consider it265
as a possible foundation.266
2.5 Category Theory267
There have been proposals that some variety of category theory (CT) be a268
foundation for mathematics as an alternative to set theory. This approach is269
similar to univalent foundations in that the primary objective is usually a dif-270
ferent foundation rather than a substantially different mathematics. It is also271
similar in that categorical foundations use topoi, which are a generalization of272
sets and whose logic is, in general, intuitionistic logic. Linnebo and Pettigrew273
[2011] survey some possibilities for using category theory as a foundation with274
some criteria, e.g., requiring independence from set theory and requiring some275
existential assertions (as ZFC asserts the existence of the empty set). Some276
theories are rejected: Synthetic Differential Geometry (SDG) as too narrow and277
the Category of Categories As Foundations (CCAF) as not independent of set278
theory. They then consider the Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets279
(ETCS) as a case study. ETCS is significantly different from set theory. In it280
everything is defined in terms of (category theoretic) arrows, including member-281
ship, which presents problems for set membership, e.g., an element cannot be a282
member of more than one set, extensionality does not hold for sets, and there283
are multiple (isomorphic) empty sets. In addition, although ETCS may be log-284
ically independent of set theory, it requires prior set theory for interpretations,285
for examples, and thus for comprehension.286
2.6 Inconsistent Mathematics287
Inconsistent mathematics is mathematics in which some contradictions are al-288
lowed [Mortensen, 1995]. If a contradiction implies all statements then the289
system is trivial, thus the logic used cannot be standard logic. The most com-290
mon alternative is some kind of relevant logic. Most of the work in this area has291
been in the logical foundations and their immediate consequences, although sug-292
gestions have been made for other possible applications including inconsistent293
databases, inconsistent pictures (such as those by Escher), earlier mathemat-294
ics (such as infinitesimals), alternative accounts of the differentiability of delta295
functions, or solutions of inconsistent sets of equations. Inconsistent set theory296
is one of the most widely studied topics within inconsistent mathematics. The297
objective is often to have a set theory based on two assumptions: unrestricted298
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comprehension (for any predicate P , ∃z∀x(x ∈ z ↔ P (x))) and extensionality299
(y = z ↔ ∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ z)). As is well known the former leads to Russell’s300
paradox by setting P (x) = (x /∈ x), and so to avoid triviality, in which all301
predicates hold, a non-explosive logic must be used.302
In this section we have briefly examined several varieties of mathematics.303
The list is not meant to be exhaustive: some varieties not discussed are vari-304
ous versions of finitism. However the above varieties should be enough for the305
following discussion. If a philosophy of mathematics is to be inclusive of mathe-306
matical practice then it must accommodate these varieties, which have different307
logical assumptions (e.g., FOPC, intuitionistic), different set theoretic founda-308
tions (e.g., ZFC, ZFCU) or foundations not using set theory (e.g., univalent309
foundations, category theory), and even different approaches towards consis-310
tency (e.g., inconsistent mathematics). As a consequence objects, such as the311
Dirichlet comb function, may exist in one variety of mathematics but not in an-312
other variety. The discussions of the above varieties show that no single logical313
or mathematical foundation is feasible and have also given illustrations of the314
attitudes of mathematicians concerned with foundations that are compatible315
with deductive pluralism.316
3 DEDUCTIVE PLURALISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF317
MATHEMATICS318
As shown in the previous sections there are varieties of mathematics with in-319
compatible logical or mathematical foundations. Deductive pluralism proposes320
that the simplest way to view mathematics with respect to the requirements of321
inclusiveness of and consistency with mathematical practice and attitudes is to322
allow for a plurality of varieties and with a form of deductivism within each vari-323
ety. The pluralistic component of deductive pluralism automatically satisfies the324
criterion of inclusiveness. Within the context of a variety the definitions, theo-325
rems, proofs, and examples (which in this paper are referred to as mathematical326
practice) hold whether the foundations are considered as true in some absolute327
sense or as useful assumptions. In practice little or no reference is made to stan-328
dard previous results, much less to the foundational assumptions, such as ZFC.329
However, when an alternative foundation is used then a reference is made, as in330
the example of Bernstein’s article discussed in section 2.1. Thus the deductive331
component of deductive pluralism satisfies the criterion of compatibility with332
mathematical practice. This section will concentrate on showing that deductive333
pluralism is consistent with the attitudes of mathematicians towards their work334
and with applications. Not all mathematicians will have the same attitude and335
there is no survey of attitudes, so what we need to show is that a substantial336
proportion, possibly a majority, of their attitudes are consistent with deductive337
pluralism. But before doing this we will discuss ontological and epistemological338
considerations which are relevant to any philosophy of mathematics.339
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3.1 Ontology and Epistemology340
One of the advantages of any version of deductivism is the elimination of onto-341
logical problems since no variety is considered as true in some absolute sense and342
the basic statements are assertions that the assumptions (ultimately the foun-343
dations) imply the conclusions. Thus there are no problematic questions about344
the existence of abstract objects. For example the assumptions of standard set345
theory immediately imply the existence, within that variety, of the empty set.346
This is similar to Carnap’s view that the “reality” of abstract entities can only347
be considered within a linguistic framework. Mathematicians working within348
standard mathematics will implicitly assume standard set theory and thus will349
use the empty set and set theoretic constructions without mentioning the foun-350
dational assumptions.351
Any attempt to go beyond deductivism requires confronting the problematic352
question of the existence of abstract objects. There are many views, such as that353
of Balaguer [1998, p. 22] who considered the question as essentially meaningless:354
Now I am going to motivate the metaphysical conclusion by arguing355
that the sentence – there exist abstract objects; that is there are356
objects that exist outside of space-time (or more precisely, that do357
not exist in space-time) – does not have any truth condition... .358
One of the clearest approaches to abstract objects within mathematics is that359
of Hilbert who equated existence of such objects with consistency in his 1900360
address introducing the Hilbert Problems when he stated:361
If contradictory attributes be assigned to a concept, I say that math-362
ematically the concept does not exist. ... But if it can be proved that363
the attributes assigned to the concept can never lead to a contradic-364
tion by the application of a finite number of logical inferences, I say365
that the mathematical existence of the concept ... is thereby proved.366
[Hilbert, 1902, pp. 9–10]367
From Go¨del’s results we know that most mathematical systems of interest can-368
not prove their own consistency thus this condition must generally be replaced369
by relative consistency. In addition, Hilbert’s condition is explicitly violated in370
the case of inconsistent mathematics considered above in section 2.6. In order to371
include inconsistent mathematics the condition of consistency might be replaced372
by non-triviality.373
In deductive pluralism mathematical statements take the form of assertions374
that the assumptions, ultimately the foundations, imply the conclusions. With375
this approach the assertions (i.e., implications) are also objectively true in that376
mathematicians favoring different varieties of mathematics can agree that given377
the assumptions and a correct deduction from these then the conclusion fol-378
lows. Thus the question of epistemology for deductive pluralism centers on379
the reliability of these assertions. The assertions are usually supported by rig-380
orous, but not fully formal, proofs. There can be considerable disagreement381
on when a published proof has sufficient detail, but, as discussed in section382
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1.1 above, a common idea is that it should be possible to expand such a pub-383
lished proof to obtain a fully formal proof, e.g., one which can be checked by384
a computer proof verification program. The proof verification system Mizar385
(www.mizar.org) uses Tarski-Grothendieck set theory as its basis and the re-386
sults are in the Journal of Formalized Mathematics. As an example Go¨del’s387
completeness theorem has been verified using Mizar. The univalent foundations388
program uses Coq (coq.inria.fr) in a much more extensive way, using proof as-389
sistants “not only in the formalization of known proofs, but in the discovery390
of new ones. Indeed, many of the proofs described in this book were actually391
first done in a fully formalized form in a proof assistant...”[The Univalent Foun-392
dations Program Authors, 2013, p. 8]. According to Mackenzie [2001, p. 323]393
mechanization of proofs in the mathematical literature has supported the belief394
that these rigorous, semi-formal proofs are reliable:395
Research for this book has been unable to find a case in which the396
application of mechanized proof threw doubt upon an established397
mathematical theorem, and only one case in which it showed the398
need significantly to modify an accepted rigorous-argument proof.399
This is testimony to the robustness of “social processes” within400
mathematics.401
Nothing is perfect and there are errors in published proofs which may lie unde-402
tected for many years, especially in those which are seldom examined. However403
mechanical checking, as with Coq or Mizar, substantially reduces the chance for404
error and provides a robust check on mathematics.405
The questions of mathematical ontology and epistemology are related to how406
mathematics is viewed: is it discovery or creation. Deductive pluralism provides407
a clear perspective on this question. A mathematician works within the con-408
text of a variety of mathematics with foundational mathematical and logical409
assumptions, definitions, and previous results. Within this context necessary410
consequences are discovered. Sometimes a mathematician generalizes and ab-411
stracts out features of existing examples to create a new definition, such as412
the development of the abstract group concept in the nineteenth century. Or413
a mathematician may extend an existing variety to accommodate mathemati-414
cal requirements, such as the extension of ZFC to ZFCU by Grothendieck, or415
develop a new variety such as constructive mathematics. These activities can416
be viewed as the creation of new theories or varieties of mathematics. Thus417
mathematics involves both discovery of new mathematical results (from exist-418
ing mathematics) and creation of new concepts (by generalization, unification,419
and abstraction).420
3.2 Consistency with Attitudes of Mathematicians421
This section will consider the consistency of deductive pluralism with the atti-422
tudes of mathematicians towards foundations – do mathematicians regard some423
variety or its foundations as true in some absolute sense? If this were so, then424
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there would be a conflict between deductive pluralism and the attitudes of math-425
ematicians. Almost all the work in mathematics, past or present, is within stan-426
dard mathematics and for those within this tradition there is no need to consider427
or mention the foundational assumptions – FOPC and standard set theory. If a428
mathematician uses another foundation then that is usually mentioned, as was429
illustrated in the above section 2.1 on nonstandard analysis. Also, the attitudes430
of contemporary mathematicians towards foundations tend to be consistent with431
deductive pluralism in that when foundations are considered they are not viewed432
as true or false in some absolute sense. Some examples will be given from lead-433
ing mathematicians when they consider foundational questions. The univalent434
foundations group wrote that “we therefore believe that univalent foundations435
will eventually become a viable alternative to set theory as the ‘implicit foun-436
dation’ for the unformalized mathematics done by most mathematicians” [The437
Univalent Foundations Program Authors, 2013, p. 1], thus demonstrating both438
a pluralistic and deductive attitude. Mumford [2000, p. 208] has suggested that439
statistical random variables should be a primitive concept with stochastic set440
theory as a foundation for mathematics. In order to do this he made explicit441
some assumptions about standard mathematics when he wrote: “This calls for442
the most difficult part of this proposed reformulation of the foundations: we443
need to decide how to define stochastic set theory. Clearly we must drop either444
the axiom of choice or the power set axiom.” If they can be dropped, then they445
cannot be regarded as true in some absolute sense.446
Philosophers have commented on the attitudes of mathematicians towards447
foundations. Maddy [1989, p. 1223–4] generalized about the attitude of mathe-448
maticians when she wrote that “[w]hat you hear from the mathematician intent449
on avoiding philosophy often sounds more like this: ‘All I’m doing is showing450
that this follows from that. Truth has nothing to do with it. Mathematics is just451
a study of what follows from what.’ ” Of course, from the point of view of de-452
ductive pluralism the characterization of mathematics as studying “what follows453
from what” is not an avoidance of philosophy but an assertion of philosophy, i.e,454
some form of deductivism. In a similar vein Clarke-Doane [2013, p. 470] wrote455
that “[m]athematicians are overwhelmingly concerned with questions of logic —456
questions of what follows from what” and Hellman and Bell [2006, p. 65] express457
a compatible view that “[t]o be sure, classical practice itself does not imply en-458
dorsement of Platonism, as many mainstream mathematicians, if pressed, fall459
back on some kind of formalism or fictionalism.” These views are also supported460
by Hersh [1997, p. 39] who wrote: “Writers agree: The working mathematician461
is a Platonist on weekdays and a formalist on Sundays.” This can be interpreted462
as stating that when doing mathematics (on weekdays) within the context and463
implicit assumptions of a variety a mathematician can assert existence, e.g., of464
the empty set, but when reflecting on mathematics or considering foundational465
questions (on Sundays) a more deductivist view is adopted.466
The above examples of specific statements by mathematicians when consid-467
ering foundational questions show that there is support for deductivism and468
pluralism. Also, if the above statements by philosophers and others discussing469
the views of mathematicians are correct, then attitudes consistent with deduc-470
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tivism are widespread. For some arguments supporting a form of absolute truth471
or consistency, see section 4.1 below.472
3.3 Consistency with Applied Mathematics473
We will now consider the consistency of deductive pluralism with applications474
of mathematics. Deductivism views mathematical statements as asserting that475
certain conclusions follow from the assumptions within a variety. There is some-476
thing of an analogy in applications which use models of natural systems and de-477
rives conclusions from these models using mathematical theory. In more detail,478
a natural system, physical or social, is modelled by selecting some components479
that are relevant to the scientist. This model is often designed with regard480
to the available mathematical techniques and a correspondence is set up be-481
tween mathematical elements and natural elements. Mathematical deduction482
then produces consequences that map back to the natural system, thus giving483
supporting or disconfirming evidence for the model when compared to data.484
Usually the mathematical theory used is part of standard mathematics since485
it was axiomatized to be consistent with existing mathematical practices in-486
cluding applications. However the use of other varieties is possible, e.g., there487
has been some interest in using nonstandard analysis in applications such as488
by Albeverio et. al. [1985]. Sometimes within science the term “model” is489
explicitly used: e.g., the “standard model” in particle physics, the “Hodgkin-490
Huxley model” in biology, the “General Circulation Model” in climatology, and491
the “Gibbs model” in thermodynamics. The models are not viewed as true in492
some absolute sense, but as approximations; e.g., when a better model is found493
it replaces the previous model as when General Relativity replaced Newtonian494
gravitational theory. The consistency of deductivism with applied mathematics495
was supported by Resnik who wrote “it [deductivism] appears to account nicely496
for the applicability of mathematics, both potential and actual; for when one497
finds a physical structure satisfying the axioms of a mathematical theory, the498
application of that theory is immediate” [Resnik, 1980, p. 118].499
One factor that allows immediate application of a theory is the fact that500
sometimes the mathematical theory and its applications are developed together501
by the same person or as part of a long tradition. Some examples in physics502
of interaction between mathematical theory and physical theory are the New-503
tonian gravitational model which was developed by Newton along with the cal-504
culus; Einstein’s General Relativity of the early twentieth century which relied505
on Riemann’s theory of differential manifolds from the mid-nineteenth century,506
but which also spurred research on semi-Riemannian manifolds; the interac-507
tion between the development of quantum mechanics and operator theory; and508
string theory which has had major interactions with new mathematics such as509
Calabi-Yau manifolds and mirror symmetry. As an example of the conjoined510
development of models and theory in biology and statistics, Ronald Fisher has511
been called a founder of modern statistics and the greatest biologist since Dar-512
win by Dawkins [2011]: “Not only was he the most original and constructive513
of the architects of the neo-Darwinian synthesis, Fisher also was the father of514
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modern statistics and experimental design.” These examples of the joint devel-515
opment of mathematical theory and natural system models will be referred to516
below in section 4.2 when objections to deductivism based on applications are517
considered.518
This section has shown that deductive pluralism is consistent with math-519
ematical practice, applications and attitudes about mathematics. Mathemati-520
cians work within a variety of mathematics and thus their assertions, either521
formal or informal, implicitly assume the foundations of that variety. But when522
considering the foundations, especially in recent times, mathematicians do not523
view the foundations as true in some absolute sense. In applications a variety of524
mathematics is applied to a model of a natural system to deduce consequences525
and compare with data. Some criticisms of deductivism related to applications526
are discussed below in section 4.2.527
4 POSSIBLE CRITICISMS528
This section will consider some possible objections to deductive pluralism. Since529
deductive pluralism can be viewed as an extension of previous versions of de-530
ductivism (if-thenism) some objections to earlier versions of deductivism will be531
discussed as they may apply to the philosophy presented here.532
4.1 Objections Based on Absolute Views533
Some objections are based on the view that some foundation is true or false in534
an absolute sense rather than merely in the sense within mathematical model535
theory, and mathematics more broadly, in which a sentence is true if and only536
if it is true in all models. An example is Platonism, a strong version of which537
considers the entities and concepts as eternal, acausal, objectively true, and538
mind independent. There are also weaker versions of objections based on ab-539
solute truth or consistency. Resnik [1997, p. 142] wrote that “[deductivism] is540
an unsatisfactory doctrine. Mathematicians want to know that their systems541
have models; and they want to know this absolutely, and not just relative to a542
metaphysical theory.” Wants cannot always be satisfied: “if wishes were horses,543
beggars would ride.” However, contrary to Resnik’s assertion, we have seen that544
mathematicians who consider foundational questions accept relative consistency,545
e.g., as quoted above in section 2.4: “[a]s with any foundational system, con-546
sistency is a relative question” [The Univalent Foundations Program Authors,547
2013, p. 11]. More generally this view contradicts the previously discussed548
assertions by Maddy, Clarke-Doane, and individual mathematicians that math-549
ematicians are concerned with “what follow from what.” From a more technical550
point of view the absolute existence of a model would conflict with Go¨del’s result551
that having a model implies consistency, and (first order) systems of the power552
needed cannot prove their own consistency. Thus such views require some form553
of Platonism in which consistency is assumed absolutely rather than relatively554
or implicitly. This contradicts our requirement of inclusiveness since adherents555
of different varieties of mathematics want contradictory things: users of TG556
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set theory want it to be consistent, while strict constructivists may not believe557
that ZFC, much less TG, is consistent. Even Resnik in the pages preceding558
this assertion in a discussion of mathematical practice wrote that “[t]he real559
issue concerns what is true if [the axioms] are true, and in the course of proving560
theorems one provides conclusive evidence for such conditional truths” [Resnik,561
1997, p. 140].562
As another example of an objection relying on an absolute concept of truth563
Hellman [1989, p. 26] wrote that a “decisive objection” to if-thenism is to sup-564
pose that an arithmetic sentence is implied by some assumptions but that the565
antecedent is false, e.g., that there is no natural number sequence. Then using566
FOPC, in which a false sentence implies all statements, the assumptions would567
imply all sentences. There is an implicit assumption that the assertion that568
there is a natural number sequence can be classified as true or false in some569
absolute sense. How can this be done? A natural number sequence is an ab-570
stract object, so we return to the vexed question of conditions for the existence571
of abstracta. For example, using Hilbert’s criterion for non-existence, which is572
that the concept leads to a contradiction, the only way that it can be deter-573
mined that there is no natural number sequence is to find a contradiction in574
the Dedekind-Peano axioms, which is possible but seems very unlikely. Math-575
ematicians do sometimes look for such contradictions. For example in 2013 a576
well-known mathematician, Edward Nelson, posted a claim that he had found577
a contradiction within the Dedekind-Peano axioms, but an error in his reason-578
ing was soon found and the claim was withdrawn. This example illustrates the579
fact that although consistency is generally (implicitly) assumed mathematicians580
sometimes look for contradictions within the standard foundations, and the fail-581
ures of these explicit efforts give additional support to the assumption that the582
standard foundations are consistent. If such a contradiction were found then a583
likely result would be a modified set of axioms that avoids the contradiction and584
preserves (almost all) mathematics as occurred with the discovery of Russell’s585
paradox.586
Some philosophers argue against deductivism on the basis of absolute views587
about sets. For example in discussing the continuum hypothesis (CH), which588
states that any infinite subset of the reals must have the same cardinality as589
(be equinumerous with) either the reals or the natural numbers, Maddy [1989,590
p. 1124] wrote that “if we move to the idea of second order consequence, the591
Continuum Hypothesis becomes a real question in its own right, in the sense592
that it either follows or doesn’t follow from second order ZF. But CH is just593
the sort of question If-thenism hopes to count as meaningless.” A problem594
with this objection is that for second order ZF (which assumes proper classes)595
to determine CH requires an absolute concept of sets. Jane´ [2005, p. 797]596
wrote that “claiming that canonical second-order consequence is determinate597
requires taking a strong realist view of set theory.” Such a strong realist view598
assumes existential conditions on abstracta that are hard to justify and that are599
unnecessary from the point of view of deductive pluralism. In practice there600
is little or no use of CH outside of logic. If it were needed then deductive601
pluralism could view ZFC+CH as a reasonable foundation for mathematics.602
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Also, if-thenism (or deductivism, or deductive pluralism) would not view CH as603
meaningless but as indeterminate using standard axiom systems.604
Some mathematicians do have attitudes that assert the absolute existence605
of abstract objects, especially in set theory. An example is a possible extension606
of ZFC by the Axiom of Constructibility, which asserts that the universe of sets607
(V ) is identical to all constructible sets (L), i.e., V = L. This axiom resolves608
some major questions in set theory, in particular the continuum hypothesis:609
ZFC+V=L implies CH. However ZFC+V=L is inconsistent with many of the610
large cardinal axioms (although it is consistent with Grothendieck Universes).611
Thus Hauser and Wooden [2014, p. 13] wrote: “In fact the assertion V = L itself612
is almost certainly false because among other things it rules out the existence of613
measurable cardinals.” More generally, Hamkins [2014, p. 25] wrote that this is614
a common view: “Set theorists often argue against the axiom of constructibility615
V = L on the basis that it is restrictive.” But he also wrote that this view616
is based on an absolute set concept. Such absolute attitudes are inconsistent617
with deductive pluralism since they would rule out those with other views, for618
example those who would accept ZFC+V=L.619
The belief in the absolute existence of some mathematical object contra-620
dicts deductive pluralism since such a belief would require that contradictory621
assumptions be rejected, thus violating pluralism. Such a belief may provide622
motivation for research, but does not affect mathematical statements since these623
statements assert that an implication holds: an assumption implies a conclusion.624
If the mathematical argument is valid, then the implication holds whether or625
not the assumption is viewed as an absolute truth. For example, in the case of626
extending ZFC with the large cardinal axiom of measurable cardinals the rigor-627
ous proof that the existence of a measurable cardinal implies that V 6= L holds628
whether or not one believes in the absolute truth of the existence of measurable629
cardinals.630
4.2 Objections Based on Applications631
Other objections view applications as determining the validity of foundations:632
the existence of applications of mathematics is sometimes used not only to justify633
mathematics but to allow attribution of absolute truth or falsity to mathemati-634
cal statements. This view would contradict pluralism since varieties, or theories635
within varieties, not supported by applications would be viewed as false. As636
an example Resnik [1997, p. 99] wrote: “On my account, ultimately our evi-637
dence for mathematics and mathematical objects is their usefulness in science638
and practical life.” Similarly Azzouni [1994, p. 84] wrote: “In particular, the639
truth or falsity of a particular branch of mathematics or logic turns rather di-640
rectly on whether it is applied to the empirical sciences.” First let us consider641
what portion of mathematics is relevant to applications to the empirical sci-642
ences. Physics is the area of science most often discussed in the philosophy of643
mathematics, but the mathematical physicist Roger Penrose [2005, p. 18] wrote644
that “[it] is certainly the case that the vast preponderance of the activities of645
pure mathematicians today has no obvious connection with physics.” Thus if646
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Penrose is even approximately correct any philosophy of mathematics that re-647
quires applicability will be unable to satisfy the condition that a philosophy of648
mathematics be inclusive. Another problem is that this view has mathematical649
objects flickering in and out of existence. As an example of this applicability cri-650
terion for mathematical existence Riemann’s differentiable manifolds, developed651
in the nineteenth century, flickered into existence in the twentieth century with652
Einstein’s General Relativity, and entire branches of mathematics may flicker653
out of existence if theories such as loop quantum gravity or the speculations by654
Einstein and Feynman that space and time are discrete result in superior dis-655
crete models replacing continuous models in physics. Few people would reject656
a field of mathematics merely on ephemeral considerations of applicability.657
Other objections also centered on applications criticize deductivism. For658
example Maddy [1989, p. 1124–1125] wrote that:659
[b]ut for all this, the argument that seems to have clinched the case660
against If-thenism for Russell and Putnam is a version of Frege’s661
problem, a problem about applications. Reformulated for the If-662
thenist, it becomes: how can the fact that one mathematical sen-663
tence follows from another be correctly used to derive true physical664
conclusions from true physical premises?2665
Consider a natural model, such as Newtonian gravitation. It is not a physical666
“truth”: it is a model of physical reality, which is now an approximation to an667
improved model, General Relativity. Objections to deductivism that rely on ap-668
plicability to natural systems seem to often assume, sometimes implicitly, that669
physical theories are absolutely true rather than approximate models: models of670
reality should not be conflated with reality. It also should be noted that mathe-671
matical deductions sometimes give results applicable to natural system models672
because they are designed to do so since, as the previous section on consistency673
with applied mathematics illustrated, in many cases the mathematical theory674
and applications to natural systems are developed together by an individual or675
by a research community.676
In this subsection we have seen that objections based on applications do677
not hold. Some objections are based on the mistaken belief that models of678
natural systems are true in some absolute sense; other objections are based on679
an extreme view of mathematics as necessarily playing a subordinate role to680
ephemeral models of natural systems.681
2It is not clear that Russell abandoned his original view. In the preface to the second
edition of Principles of Mathematics Russell [1937, p. v] wrote: “The fundamental thesis
of the following pages, that mathematics and logic are identical, is one which I have never
since seen any reason to modify.” This logicism is Russell’s version of if-thenism: “PURE
Mathematics is the class of all propositions of the form ‘p implies q’;” [Russell, 1937, p. 3].
What Russell did criticize in the second edition is strict formalism in which the symbols
are uninterpreted. However deductive pluralism (and possibly if-thenism) does not require
uninterpreted symbols.
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4.3 Objections Based on Mathematical Practice and Attitudes682
Objection to deductivism are sometimes based on mathematical practice. Maddy683
[1989, p. 1124] wrote that “we need to ask what mathematicians were doing be-684
fore arithmetic was axiomatized. Was it not mathematics?” It was mathemat-685
ics, which has been expanded, rationalized, and given additional interpretations686
throughout history. These changes have incorporated previous mathematics.687
For example the study of natural numbers assumes they are infinite (or po-688
tentially infinite) and is abstracted from experience with finite collections of689
discrete persistent objects. The Dedekind-Peano axiomatization of the natural690
numbers in the 1880s incorporated this experience and since then the elementary691
number theoretic results are consequences of these axioms. This is an example692
of the axiomatization of mathematics which has occurred over many decades693
and has made implicit assumptions explicit. Deductivism might be viewed as694
an incorporation of this development into philosophy: just as the properties of695
the natural numbers follow from the Dedekind-Peano axioms, so do the proper-696
ties of a variety of mathematics follow from the foundational mathematical and697
logical axioms.698
Resnik [1980, pp. 133–136] wrote that “deductivism is a powerful and ap-699
pealing philosophy of mathematics”, but he expressed concerns about “loose700
ends” related to mathematical practice. The first concern was that the deduc-701
tivist “would need to explain why realism is acceptable in nuclear physics but702
not in mathematics.” Some concepts of realism will be discussed later, but the703
basic answer to this objection is that physics develops models of space-time704
objects and processes while mathematics does not, although it may be applied705
to such models as previously discussed. This objection also suggests the error706
discussed above in section 4.2 in which models of reality are conflated with re-707
ality. Another of Resnik’s concerns was that “deductivism may be unable to708
present a satisfactory epistemology for deductive reasoning itself.” As has been709
noted, different varieties of mathematics have different views about the rules for710
deductive reasoning (e.g., the acceptance of LEM), so in deductive pluralism the711
logic is part of the foundational assumptions. Resnik also wrote that according712
to the deductivist the “sincere affirmations of the mathematician that a certain713
mathematical structure exists and that certain statements are true are ellipti-714
cal” and that the mathematician denies that they are elliptical. However such715
statements are made in a context of implicit assumptions, such as standard set716
theory, definitions, results, and methods. In the given context the statements717
are true in that they follow from the implicit assumptions. In addition, Resnik’s718
claim about the attitude of mathematicians is inconsistent with the statements719
cited in section 3.2 by mathematicians and by philosophers that mathematicians720
are concerned with “what follows from what.”721
A final objection along related lines is that deductivism is incomplete. Hell-722
man [1989, p. 9] wrote that “a straightforward formalist or deductive approach723
is ruled out by the Go¨del incompleteness theorems: no consistent formal system724
can generate all sentences standardly interpreted as truths ‘about the intended725
type of structures(s).’ ” This objection has several problems: it primarily ap-726
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plies to deductivism when the foundations are fixed unlike in deductive pluralism727
where the foundations vary; the incompleteness theorems apply to most philoso-728
phies of mathematics and deductive pluralism’s pluralistic component allows it729
to handle incompleteness as well as other philosophies; and a problematic abso-730
lute concept of truth seems to be used since what is considered as true will vary,731
e.g., in set theory is CH true? does a Grothendieck Universe exist? – questions732
which most mathematicians do not even consider since they do not impinge on733
their work and where there is no common view.734
5 RELATED PHILOSOPHIES735
This section considers the relationship between deductive pluralism and some736
other philosophies of mathematics. One problem of discussing these is that737
there are often multiple versions of each philosophy. Thus only some features738
of other philosophies most relevant to deductive pluralism are considered.739
5.1 Fictionalism740
Fictionalism is a variety of nominalism since it asserts the non-existence of ab-741
stracta. Balaguer [2013] wrote that the basic tenets of fictionalism are that742
(1) mathematical theorems and theories assert the existence of abstracta, (2)743
abstracta do not exist, (3) and thus mathematical theorems and theories are744
false. Deductive pluralism denies this syllogism since (1) is not accepted: math-745
ematical theorems and theories are about “what implies what.” As has been746
shown in section 3.2 this is consistent with the attitudes of mathematicians and747
philosophers (e.g., Mumford, Clarke-Doane, Maddy, and univalent foundations)748
and with the fact that mathematicians leave as implicit the foundations, es-749
pecially when they use standard mathematics, but make them explicit when750
using an alternative variety (e.g., in Bernstein and Robinson’s paper quoted751
in section 2.1). Balaguer also discussed another fictionalist slogan that asserts752
mathematical statements are “true in the story of mathematics.” This use of753
the word “story” asserts an analogy to fiction, and adds unnecessary baggage754
to nominalism. Literary fictions deal with events in imaginary space-times, e.g.,755
Sherlock Holmes in London, which is not the case for mathematical objects such756
as numbers. As Burgess [2004, p. 35] wrote in his conclusion to a discussion757
of fictionalism: “I think that in view of this radical difference between mathe-758
matics and novels, fables, or other literary genres, the slogan ‘mathematics is759
a fiction’ not very appropriate, and the comparison of mathematics to fiction760
not very apt.” In any case, the slogan “true in the story of mathematics” can761
be given an interpretation consistent with deductive pluralism. To do this we762
consider a “story” to be a variety of mathematics and the assertion that “a763
statement is true in a story of mathematics” becomes “a statement is implied764
within a variety of mathematics.”765
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5.2 Realism766
Some philosophies of mathematics have a realistic view of mathematical con-767
cepts or entities. Platonism is a strong realism since the entities and concepts768
are viewed as eternal, acausal, objectively true, and mind independent. Such769
views usually contradict deductive pluralism since they reject incompatible va-770
rieties. However there are many versions of realism, including the one given by771
Putnam [1975, pp. 69–70] who wrote:772
I am indebted to Michael Dummett for the following very simple773
and elegant formulation of realism: A realist (with respect to a given774
theory or discourse) holds that (1) the sentences of that theory or775
discourse are true or false; and (2) that what makes them true or776
false is something external – that is to say, it is not (in general) our777
sense data, actual or potential, or the structure of our minds, or our778
language, etc.779
In deductive pluralism the fully formalized statements are implications that are780
true or false, possibly automatically verified. Also, these statements depend781
only on the logical and mathematical syntax. Thus the statements of deduc-782
tive pluralism may satisfy Putnam’s the criteria for realism, depending on the783
interpretation of the second condition.784
5.3 Other Forms of Pluralism785
Various forms of pluralism have been advocated. Rudolf Carnap in The Logical786
Syntax of Language [Carnap, 1937, p. xv] wrote:787
Let any postulates and any rules of inference be chosen arbitrarily;788
then this choice, whatever it may be, will determine what meaning is789
to be assigned to the fundamental logical symbols. By this method,790
also, the conflict between the divergent points of view on the problem791
of the foundations of mathematics disappears ... . The standpoint792
which we have suggested – we will call it the Principle of Tolerance793
... [thus] before us lies the boundless ocean of unlimited possibilities.794
Koellner [2009, p. 98] considered Carnap’s position as too radical and that “[t]he795
trouble with Carnap’s entire approach (as I see it) is that the question of plu-796
ralism has been detached from actual developments in mathematics.” Koellner797
then went on to consider pluralism with respect to additional axioms for ZFC798
with the general view that the choices are not arbitrary and that there is a ques-799
tion of truth other than model-theoretic truth. (His paper used the last lyrical800
phrase of the quotation from Carnap as an epigraph and coda.) Since both pos-801
tulates and rules of inference are included in Carnap’s position it can be viewed802
as a generalization of deductive pluralism. However since deductive pluralism803
is based on actual mathematical practice, it avoids Koellner’s criticism.804
Another form of pluralism was advocated by Pedeferri and Friend [2011].805
Their proposal was a form of methodological pluralism, allowing “deviant”806
19
proofs “where mathematicians use steps which deviate from the rigorous set807
of rules methodologies and axioms agreed to in advance.” Rigorous proofs were808
not required to be fully formal: there can be missing steps that in principle809
can be filled by relatively routine work in to produce a formal proof, which is810
consistent with the usage of this paper. They claimed that there are many de-811
viant proofs and gave as the central case study the classification of finite simple812
groups. The basis for the claim that a portion of the classification was deviant813
was an interview with Serre [Raussen and Skau, 2004] in which, according to814
Pedeferri and Friend, Serre found that deviant methods were used to overcome815
an impasse. This does not correctly represent the issue, which was the classifi-816
cation of “quasi-thin” groups and which at one point relied on an unpublished817
manuscript. Those who considered that the classification was complete at that818
time viewed the quasi-thin case as having been satisfactorily dealt with by the819
manuscript. Serre considered it as a substantial gap. The question was not one820
of “deviant” methodology: all the classification was carried out with standard821
mathematics and methods. The question was whether the manuscript was suffi-822
cient. As it turned out Serre was correct and the quasi-thin case was completed823
at about the time of the Serre interview. Methodological pluralism was con-824
sidered as part of a larger program of pluralism in Friend [2013]. In this work825
Friend advocated pluralism with respect to mathematics, including inconsistent826
mathematics. She did not consider foundations containing both mathematical827
and logical components. Instead she suggested the use of some paraconsistent828
logic when the varieties of mathematics are compared. No specific version of829
the many types of paraconsistent logic was advocated, and no example of its use830
was given. There is also the problem that any overarching logic used to compare831
and contrast the varieties of mathematics must include intuitionistic logic (as832
in constructive mathematics) or predicative mathematics (as in the univalent833
foundations approach) as well as other possible logics. When the mathematical834
and logical foundations are considered together, as in deductive pluralism, the835
attempt to use an overarching logic is unnecessary.836
There are also advocates for pluralism of two varieties of mathematics or for837
pluralistic extensions of an existing variety. Davies [2005] discussed standard838
(called “classical” in the paper) and constructive mathematics, with an emphasis839
on the justification of constructive mathematics. The paper viewed each of these840
two varieties as valid within its own context. He wrote [Davies, 2005, p. 272] that841
“[o]ne should simply accept each mathematical theory on its merits, and judge842
it according to the non-triviality and interest of the results proved within it.”843
This is pluralism with respect to two varieties and the phrase “proved within it”844
contains a suggestion of deductivism. Thus deductive pluralism is compatible845
with this view, extending it to general varieties of mathematics and grounding846
them in an explicitly deductivist format. An example of pluralism within a847
particular area is the approach to set theory developed by Hamkins [2014],848
which he calls the set-theoretic multiverse, in which there are many distinct849
concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe.850
This section has considered some related work in the philosophy of math-851
ematics and has shown that some approaches are consistent with pluralism or852
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deductivism. Thus deductive pluralism as advocated in this paper provides a853
systematic approach that encompasses much of this other work.854
6 CONCLUSION855
This paper shows that deductive pluralism is inclusive of and consistent with856
mathematical practice and attitudes. It is inclusive of mathematical practice857
since it allows various logical and mathematical foundations, and is flexible858
enough to allow for future developments. Its consistency with mathematical859
practice and attitudes is shown in several ways: by the statements of mathe-860
maticians who base their work on something other than standard mathematics861
who explicitly state their foundations (such as nonstandard analysis); by the862
expressed view of mathematicians who consider altering the standard founda-863
tions (such as Mumford and those working in Univalent Foundations); and by864
the statements of philosophers of mathematics who report that mathematicians865
are concerned with “what follows from what.”866
Deductive pluralism also has significant philosophical advantages. Mathe-867
matical statements take the form of deductions, ultimately from the foundations.868
As a consequence the ontological problem of the existence of abstract objects is869
eliminated and the problem of epistemology is reduced to the validity of proofs.870
Also, given the validity of a proof, possibly verified by a proof assistant, then871
the statement is objectively true in that mathematicians supporting any variety872
of mathematics would agree that within another variety the conclusion follows873
from the assumptions.874
7 APPENDIX: LOGIC875
This appendix will present in more detail some logical assumptions that dif-876
fer between the varieties of mathematics and will discuss some logical results877
used in the discussion of these varieties. There is a distinction between syntax878
(primarily form) and semantics (related to meaning or truth). Thus when a879
statement is considered as true, it is implicitly meant as true in some interpre-880
tation. As an introduction to interpretations of formal systems some examples881
of interpretations of logics in terms of sets will also be given.882
7.1 Classical Sentential Logic883
Most of mathematics uses classical sentential logic and its extension to First884
Order Predicate Calculus (FOPC). Propositions are combined using conjunction885
∧, disjunction ∨, negation ¬, and other connectives into new propositions. If a886
formula has a free variable, e.g., P (x), the universal quantifier ∀ or existential887
quantifier ∃ can be used to bind the free variables, e.g., ∀xP (x), producing a888
sentence, which by definition has no free variables. The main deductive rule is889
modus ponens: if P holds and if P → Q holds then Q holds. In classical logic890
implication is defined as “material implication”: P → Q is equivalent to (or891
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defined as) ¬P holds or Q holds, i.e., ¬P ∨ Q. In this logic a false sentence892
implies every sentence, since if P is false, ¬P is true, ¬P ∨ Q holds, and so893
P → Q (“explosion” is when a false statement implies every statement). Non-894
classical logics often retain modus ponens but do not use material implication.895
A second element of classical sentential logic that varies is the Law of Excluded896
Middle (LEM): for any sentence P either P holds or ¬P holds and so P ∨ ¬P897
always holds.898
An interpretation of sentential logic can be given in which a sentence cor-899
responds to a set in the Boolean algebra of all subsets of a fixed set U (the900
universe). In this interpretation ∨ corresponds to set union ∪, ∧ corresponds901
to set intersection ∩, and negation ¬ corresponds to set complement. When902
discussing interpretations the same letter will used for a sentence and its inter-903
pretation to simplify notation if there is no danger of confusion.904
7.2 Intuitionistic Logic905
Intuitionistic logic is used in several varieties of mathematics, including con-906
structive mathematics. This logic rejects LEM and consequently rejects the gen-907
eral form of proof by contradiction ¬¬P → P . However some particular proofs908
by contradiction still go through since by a theorem of Brouwer ¬¬¬P → ¬P909
holds in intuitionistic logic.910
An interpretation of intuitionistic logic can be given in which a sentence911
corresponds to an open set in a fixed topological space U where ∨ and ∧ are912
as in the Boolean set interpretation of classical sentential logic (since the union913
and intersection of two open sets are both open), but negation corresponds to914
the interior of the set complement int(Ac) (since the complement of an open915
set is not generally open) and instead of material implication, where A→ B is916
defined as ¬A ∨ B, the intuitionistic interpretation takes the interior: A → B917
corresponds to int(Ac ∪ B). Since false corresponds to the empty set and true918
corresponds to its complement, U , LEM corresponds to A∪ int(Ac) = U , which919
need not hold for all A. Thus LEM fails as desired in this interpretation of920
intuitionistic logic.921
7.3 Paraconsistent Logic922
A paraconsistent logic is one that does not allow the derivation of all sentences in923
the case that some sentence and its negative have both been derived. In classical924
logic if both P and ¬P are asserted, then any sentence Q can be asserted – from925
a contradiction everything follows –ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ). Thus a926
paraconsistent logic must change classical logic to prevent this explosion and927
thus triviality (in which all statements can be derived). Various proposals have928
been made for paraconsistent logic; one of the most common is relevant logic929
in which the conclusion of a deduction must be relevant to the assumption. A930
way of doing this is to require both A and B to have a common term as a931
precondition for the assertion of A → B. In ECQ the conclusion need not be932
relevant to the assumption, so relevant logic blocks explosion.933
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An interpretation of paraconsistent logic is closed set logic, a dual to the934
interpretation of intuitionistic logic. In this approach a sentence corresponds to a935
closed set in a fixed topological space. As with the interpretation of intuitionistic936
logic, ∨ corresponds to union and ∧ corresponds to intersection. The interesting937
case is again negation. Since in general the complement of a closed set is not938
closed, negation corresponds to the closure of the complement Ac. In parallel939
with the intuitionistic case A ∧ ¬A corresponds to A ∩ Ac, which need not be940
empty (i.e., false).941
7.4 Model Theory942
A few results are used from FOPC (in which there is only one type of variable),943
model theory, and Go¨del’s theorems.944
Let L0 be a logic, in this case FOPC. A first order language L is an extension945
of L0 obtained by adding relation, function, and constant symbols. (These can946
all be considered relation symbols, e.g., a constant symbol is a 0-ary relation947
symbol.) One of these relation symbols will be the binary equivalence relation of948
equality, if it is not considered to be part of the logic. A first order L-theory T is949
L together with a collection of sentences, which can be viewed as axioms, in the950
language L. (Sometimes the term “theory” is used for both the axioms and all951
sentences that can be deduced from them.) If S is a collection of sentences and952
a sentence φ can be deduced from S by a finite number of applications of the953
rules of deduction (such as modus ponens) then φ is a syntactic (or deductive)954
consequence of S, which is written symbolically as S ` φ. A collection S of955
sentences is inconsistent if there is some sentence φ such that both φ and ¬φ956
can be deduced, i.e., S ` φ and S ` ¬φ.957
Standard model theory uses sets, often not in the context of a specific set958
theory. In this approach an interpretation of L is an L-structure: a set (or959
domain) over which the variables range together with assignments sending con-960
stant, relation and function symbols to constants, functions, and relations on961
the domain. Thus we have four elements: a logic, a language, a theory (all three962
formal and generally uninterpreted), and an interpretation of the language. The963
L-structure interpreting T is assumed to have a consistent way of determining964
if a relation is satisfied. The logic, language, and theory are together referred965
to as a (first order) deductive system. An L-structure M is said to be a model966
of an L-theory T , or M satisfies T , if all the sentences of T interpreted in M967
are satisfied in M . Symbolically this is written M |= T , read as M models968
T . A sentence φ in the language L is defined to be true or semantically valid969
(or model-theoretically valid) if it is satisfied in all interpretations, i.e., M |= φ970
for all interpretations M . Thus “true” in model theory (and more generally in971
mathematics) means true in all models. The models symbol is also used in the972
slightly different form S |= φ where S is a collection of sentences in L, φ is a973
sentence in L, and S |= φ means that every model of S is also a model of φ.974
When S |= φ holds we say that φ is a semantic consequence of S. Thus there975
are two versions of consequence: syntactic consequence S ` φ and semantic976
consequence S |= φ.977
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The following results from logic and model theory are used:978
• Go¨del’s completeness theorem for first order systems implies that the two979
notions of consequence agree: S |= φ if and only if S ` φ.980
• Go¨del’s completeness theorem and the Go¨del-Mal’cev theorem imply that981
a first order theory is consistent if and only if it has a model. Thus an982
interpretation should not be referred to as a model unless consistency is983
proven (or assumed).984
• Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem and its extensions imply that in any985
consistent formal system containing arithmetic there are statements in the986
language of the system such that neither the statement nor its negative987
can be proven in that system.988
• Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem implies that any consistent first989
order system containing arithmetic cannot prove its own consistency. Thus990
most results are about relative consistency rather than consistency. Note991
that if a system is inconsistent then in FOPC any statement can be proven,992
including the statement that the system is consistent.993
• The compactness theorem implies that if every finite subset of a first order994
system with countably many variables has a model, then the system as a995
whole has a model.996
• The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem implies that a first order system has a997
model with a countably infinite domain if and only if it has a model with998
an uncountably infinite domain.999
As an example of these concepts we will consider the first order Dedekind-1000
Peano axiomatization of the natural numbers (with intended interpretation N =1001
{0, 1, ...}). The formal language LN of the natural numbers is (S, 0,=) where S1002
is a function symbol (interpreted as successor), 0 is a constant symbol, and =1003
is the equivalence relation of equality. The theory PN of the natural numbers1004
adds to the language LN the Dedekind-Peano axioms:1005
i. ∀x¬(S(x) = 0)
ii. ∀x∀y(S(x) = S(y)→ x = y)
iii. (φ(0) and ∀x(φ(x)→ φ(S(x))))→ ∀xφ(x)
1006
Axiom (iii) is the axiom schema of induction where, for simplicity, φ is assumed1007
to be any unary predicate formula. (In general n-ary predicate formulas are1008
used.) The arithmetic operations can be defined using these three axioms to1009
give the full set of axioms for the formal first order theory of Dedekind-Peano1010
arithmetic, PA.1011
The formal theory PA has the intended interpretation (N, S, 0,=) (where for1012
simplicity the relations in this interpretation are again given the same names1013
as the formal relation symbols). By the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem if there1014
is a countable model for a first order theory, then there are models of all infi-1015
nite cardinalities. This is an example of the inability of first order theories to1016
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distinguish orders of infinity. By the second incompleteness theorem if PA is1017
consistent it cannot prove its own consistency, and thus by the completeness1018
theorem the intended interpretation (N, S, 0,=) cannot be proven to be a model1019
of PA (without additional assumptions).1020
Assume that PA is consistent and so has a model M . Then a nonstan-1021
dard model of PA can be constructed from it by adding a new natural number1022
constant symbol c to LN giving L
′
N with symbols (S, 0,=, c). (The constant c1023
can be interpreted as an infinite number.) The theory T ′N is defined to have1024
the same sentences as PA with the addition of the countable set of sentences1025
¬(c = 0),¬(c = S(0)),¬(c = S(S(0))), ... . Let F be a finite subtheory of T ′N .1026
Then F has a model with c interpreted as a suitable element of the domain of1027
M not corresponding to any element of F . So by the compactness theorem for1028
first order logic there is a model for the infinite theory T ′N , and thus for PA.1029
This model is a nonstandard model that is not isomorphic to M .1030
Since proofs in standard mathematics apply FOPC to the axioms of ZFC, a1031
(fully formalized) proof holds in all interpretations. This can cause some seeming1032
contradictions. For example the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem implies that a1033
first order system such as ZFC has a model (i.e., is consistent) with a countably1034
infinite domain if and only if it has a model with an uncountably infinite domain.1035
So, assuming consistency, the real numbers can be defined and proven to be1036
uncountable in any interpretation. This appears to be a contradiction to the1037
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, but it is resolved by recalling that a set is countable1038
if and only if there is a one-to-one function from the natural numbers onto the1039
set. Thus from the (internal) perspective of an interpretation there may not1040
exist enough such one-to-one functions so that a set is uncountable, while from1041
the (external) perspective of another interpretation such a one-to-one function1042
exists. Thus every interpretation “thinks” that it is the intended interpretation.1043
From a deductive perspective this does not matter since a deduction from the1044
axioms of ZFC applies to all interpretations.1045
7.5 Second Order Logic1046
Some considerations concerning second order logic are needed in this paper. In1047
second order logic there are two types of variables, first order variables ranging1048
over the elements of the domain and second order variables ranging over sets of1049
elements. The second order variables are sometimes considered as properties,1050
but we will take an extensional approach in which a set corresponds to all1051
elements having that property. The standard (or canonical) interpretation of1052
second order logic is to use “all” subsets of a domain, although there is a problem1053
in deciding what “all” means. The model-theoretic results listed above do not1054
generally hold for second order logic: second order logic is not complete, since1055
S |= φ may hold but not S ` φ; the compactness theorem does not hold; and1056
the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem does not hold.1057
Quine famously referred to second order logic as “set theory in sheep’s cloth-1058
ing” [Quine, 1970, p. 66], and Shapiro wrote that “second-order logic, as un-1059
derstood through standard semantics, is intimately bound up with set theory”,1060
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[Shapiro, 2012, p. 305]. Considering the problems of second order logic such1061
as incompleteness, its close relation to set theory, its use of sets in its model-1062
theoretic semantics, its relative lack of development compared with FOPC, and1063
no clear mathematical advantages, mathematicians have generally stuck with1064
the traditional approach of standard set theory with FOPC rather than use1065
second order logic.1066
8 Appendix: Historical Examples1067
Mathematics has been practiced for thousands of years. Over this period math-1068
ematicians have abstracted, generalized, reinterpreted and axiomatized past1069
work. This section gives two examples.1070
One of the oldest practices is natural number arithmetic. The use of the1071
natural numbers grew over many centuries in many cultures, initially used for1072
counting and then in some cultures for arithmetic. Often counting is done1073
algorithmically, without any assumptions about the nature of the numbers. For1074
example natural numbers may be learned as one-to-one correspondences with1075
number names (or fingers!). This one-to-one approach is now the basis for1076
equinumerosity in standard set theory. Definitions of the natural numbers have1077
been given since early times. For example, Euclid [1908], Book VII, definition1078
1 states that “a unit is that by virtue of which each of the things that exist is1079
called one” and definition 2 states that “[a] number is a multitude composed of1080
units.” The definition of unit is unclear or circular, and multitude is not defined.1081
Of course, not all concepts can be defined if infinite regress is to be avoided.1082
Euclid also uses implicit assumptions, and there have been various proposals on1083
how to fill in the gaps. When it comes to proof Euclid interprets numbers as1084
geometrical line segments. For example, proposition 1, in which a condition is1085
given for two numbers to be prime to one another, begins “[f]or, the less of two1086
unequal numbers AB, CD . . .”, where these are line segments. Thus Euclid is1087
an early example of the use of definitions, interpretations (as line segments), and1088
implicit assumptions. Newton [1769, p. 2] defined numbers, including rationals1089
and irrationals, by abstracting from ratios: “By number we understand not so1090
much a multitude of unities, as the abstracted ratio of any quantity, to another1091
quantity of the same kind, which we take for unity.” By the end of the nineteenth1092
century the widely used properties of the natural numbers were axiomatized by1093
the Dedekind-Peano axioms, and by their extension to Peano Arithmetic, PA.1094
The applicability of the natural numbers is thus to be expected since PA is based1095
on the natural practice of cultures with discrete, stable, numerous (but finite)1096
objects. The finiteness property is a notable difference between many applied1097
uses of numbers and the axioms of PA which might lead to inconsistency: the1098
inductive axiom produces an infinity, potential or actual, of natural numbers. As1099
noted in the above discussion of standard mathematics, some mathematicians1100
have believed that PA is inconsistent due to the inductive axiom.1101
As another example of the growth of mathematical concepts consider the1102
group concept. As discussed in Kleiner [1986] the concept developed from a va-1103
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riety of sources: in the eighteenth century Euler studied modular arithmetic and1104
Lagrange studied permutations of solutions to algebraic equations; in the nine-1105
teenth century Jordan defined isomorphisms of permutation groups and Cayley1106
extended the study of groups beyond permutations to other examples, such as1107
matrices. Although Cayley was ahead of his time in abstracting the concepts to1108
sets of symbols, group elements were usually considered as transformations until1109
the twentieth century. The first study of groups without assuming them to be1110
finite, without making any assumptions as to the nature of their elements, and1111
formulated as an independent branch of mathematics may have been the book1112
“Abstract Group Theory” by O. Shmidt in 1916. Thus analogous to the axiom-1113
atization of the natural numbers the axiomatization of group theory occurred1114
as the result of a long period of development.1115
In these and other examples history shows that basic mathematical concepts1116
can arise over a long period of gradual development, abstraction, generalization,1117
and eventual axiomatization. These concepts are not arbitrarily selected vari-1118
ations on existing concepts, and in many cases the development is intertwined1119
with applications so that the rigorous definition is naturally applicable.1120
1121
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